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KEYNOTE ADDRESS
The Modernization of Corporate Law:
An Essay for Bill Cary*
MELVIN ARON EISENBERG**

The business reality to which corporate law relates is constantly evolving. The author argues that in many critical areas,
corporate statutory law has failed to evolve alongside that business reality, with the result that much of the statutory law is
obsolescent and in need of modernization. After discussing
some of the institutional reasons for this statutory obsolescence, he illustrates the problem by discussing the areas of corporate combinations, shareholders'informational rights, corporate distributions,and corporate structure,and describes how a
few statutes have managed to deal with the underlying issues
in these areas in a realistic manner. He concludes by discussing
the prospects for modernizing corporate statutory law.
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Bill Cary was the leading figure in corporate law from the
early 1960's, when he assumed the chairmanship of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, until his death. No one was his equal
in seeing the large picture and in seeing the way the law was heading. With his passing a figure of remarkably clear vision and great
moral and intellectual stature left the scene. I miss him inestimably as a friend and collaborator.
In the early part of this century, the statutory corporation law
governing publicly held corporations entered a sort of ice age.
Technical revisions continued to be made, case law principles were
occasionally codified or modified, and some transactions that were
once prohibited became permissible. Nevertheless, many fundamental problems and important new business developments often
went unrecognized and untreated, as the statutes became hopelessly frozen in critical areas. Within the last ten years, signs have
emerged that suggest that the modernization of corporate statutory law may be near at hand. This paper will discuss some of the
reasons for the long freeze (part I), consider four areas in which
statutory corporation law has become particularly unresponsive to
the real world (part II), and finally turn to some portents of change
(part III).
I.

STRUCTURAL IMPEDIMENTS TO THE MODERNIZATION OF

CORPORATE LAW

Historically, two clusters of institutional elements have inhibited the legislative modernization of corporate law. The first cluster is now so well-known that I need only summarize it here.
Under traditional choice-of-law rules, a corporation's internal affairs are governed by the law of the state in which it is incorporated, and a corporation may incorporate even in a state with
which it has no significant economic contacts. Similarly, under
traditional tax rules, a state in which a corporation is incorporated
may levy franchise taxes on the corporation, even though the corporation has no other significant economic contacts with the state.
In most large publicly held corporations, management selects the
state of incorporation: shareholders are unlikely to have sufficient
information to either make or evaluate the incorporation decision,
even if they were inclined to do so. A state with a small fiscal base,
to whom franchise taxes may be a highly significant proportion of
revenue, therefore has little financial incentive to take account of
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shareholder interests.1
The second cluster of elements inhibiting legislative modernization of corporate law concerns neutrality and information. A rule
of law may be thought of as neutral if at the time of the rule's
adoption it cannot be predicted whether the rule will systematically work for or against the interests of any given class of persons.
For example, most rules in the body of contract law-what constitutes an offer, what causes an offeree's power of acceptance to
lapse, and so forth-are neutral in this sense. In contrast, other
bodies of law consist largely of rules that do predictably and systematically. help or hurt a given class. This does not mean that
such rules are bad. For one thing, it is often appropriate to promote the interests of a given class (say, veterans). For another, in
some cases (such as labor-relations law) the very purpose of the
law is to mediate between classes of persons, and it is therefore
inevitable that any rule will favor one class or the other. The issue
then is not whether the rule is neutral, but whether it is fair and
reflects sound policy.
The body of corporate law consists largely of rules that lack
neutrality. The major concerns of corporate law are the rights,
powers, and responsibilities of managers, shareholders, and, to a
lesser extent, creditors. Virtually every rule of corporation law, no
matter how trivial, can be quickly and easily analyzed in terms of
its impact on these classes.
Over the great run of transactions, of course, the interests of
managers and shareholders coincide. Broadly speaking, shareholders and managers alike want the corporation to maximize profits.
Therefore, it is generally in the shareholders' interest that the relevant legal rules permit managers to operate the corporation's business with the maximum feasible flexibility and that the rules do
not inhibit entrepreneurial risk-taking. Nevertheless, there are
some important cases where the interests of managers and shareholders may conflict. When managers are inefficient, the interest of
shareholders is to change managers, while the interest of the managers is to stay in office. When managers transact business with the
corporation in a self-dealing capacity, the interest of the managers
may be to insulate the transaction from review, while the interest
of shareholders is to have the transaction independently reviewed
1. See Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J.
663, 666 (1974); Comment, Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporation Law of
1967, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 861 (1969).
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for fairness. The list could be extended, but the point is clear. Like
other parties to an interdependent relationship, shareholders and
managers have both coinciding and conflicting interests. Furthermore, in at least some of the areas where the interests may conflict,
the shareholders' interest is coincident with the national economic
interests in the efficient use of productive resources and in healthy
capital markets.
Neutral legislative rules can be made from behind the veil,
solely on the basis of fairness and sound policy. Nonneutral legislative rules cannot, because any class of persons that will be obviously affected by a new rule has an obvious interest in lobbying for
or against it. Such lobbying may, but need not, involve political
power. There are two sides to every story, and a lobbyist might do
no more than articulately present to the legislature the side he or
his client believes to be the right side. Serious problems can arise,
however, if a class of persons significantly affected by nonneutral
rules is not well-organized for involvement in the legislative
process.
In many bodies of law consisting of nonneutral rules, serious
problems of this type do not arise because the major classes directly affected by a body of law are all well-organized for legislative
involvement. For example, both unions and management lobby actively on labor-relations law, and both shippers and carriers lobby
actively on carrier law. In other instances serious problems of this
type do not arise, even though a directly affected class is not wellorganized for legislative involvement, because the resulting gap is
largely filled by independent or countervailing government experts.
For example, in the securities-law area Congress can draw upon
the resources of the Securities and Exchange Commission and
House and Senate committee staffs, and state legislatures can draw
upon the resources of blue-sky commissioners.
In the corporate area, a major class significantly affected by
corporate statutory law-the shareholder class-has traditionally
not been well-organized for involvement in the legislative process.
Much stock is held by shareholders whose interests are too small to
justify a significant investment in the legislative process. Most of
the balance is held by corporate institutional investors who have
the potential for effectively organizing for this purpose, but traditionally have not done so. Nor is the resulting gap filled by other
institutions. Although corporate law is technical, complex, and
outside the knowledge of most individual legislators, legislatures
typically do not have independent experts to draw on for advice.
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Although corporate law is traditionally a state concern, few states
have either executive or legislative staffs with significant corporate
law expertise.
It often happens, therefore, that although an area of statutory
corporate law has become badly outmoded in a manner that has an
unsound impact on shareholders, and often therefore on the economy, the problem is not effectively brought to the legislature's attention. Accordingly, a legislature may fail to make needed changes
to modernize its corporate law, without regard to the question of
franchise-tax dollars, because of lack of sufficient information at
the levels where it counts.

II.

FOUR CRITICAL AREAS IN THE CORPORATE STATUTES

Part II will explore four critical areas in which most corporate
statutes have fallen fifty to seventy-five years behind economic reality, due, it seems likely, to the institutional elements discussed in
part I. These areas are corporate combinations, shareholders' informational rights, corporate distributions, and corporate structure.
A.

Corporate Combinations

The prototypical corporate combination is a transaction that
may be referred to as a classical merger. Nonlawyers often use the
term merger to describe all forms of combination. To a lawyer,
however, it normally means the fusion of two corporations pursuant to an agreement executed with reference to specific statutory
merger provisions, under which the stock of one corporation (the
"transferor") is converted into stock of the other (the "survivor").
The survivor then succeeds to the transferor's assets and liabilities
by operation of law. At one time the classical merger was probably
the dominant mode of corporate combination, but in modern times
its scope has been reduced significantly. Among the most important modes of modern combination are stock-for-assets and stockfor-stock combinations. In a stock-for-assets combination, Corporation A issues shares of its own stock to Corporation B in exchange for substantially all of B's assets. Normally, A assumes B's
liabilities, although often B's liabilities are assumed only on a selective basis. Usually, B agrees that it will dissolve and distribute
its A stock to its own shareholders. Frequently, it is also agreed or
understood that some or all of B's officers and directors will join
A's management.
In a stock-for-stock combination, Corporation A issues shares
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of its own stock directly to the shareholders of Corporation B in
exchange for an amount of B stock-normally at least a majority-sufficient to carry control of B. As a result, the shareholder
groups of A and B are combined to a substantial extent, and B
becomes a subsidiary of A. Frequently, B is then liquidated or
merged into A, but whether or not this occurs, B's assets will be
under A's control. In theory, a stock-for-stock combination does
not require approval by B's management, because corporate action
by B is not required. In practice, however, the managements of
both corporations often work out the terms of the exchange beforehand. Often, it is agreed or understood that some or all of B's management will either stay on with B in its new role as a subsidiary or
will join Corporation A.
Although stock-for-assets and stock-for-stock combinations
are probably at least as prevalent today as classical mergers, most
corporate statutes do not specifically address either of these new
forms of combination. Call the corporation that issues shares the
"survivor" and the other constituent corporation the "transferor.''
In the absence of explicit statutory provision, a stock-for-assets
combination might be viewed as a merger of the transferor and the
survivor, or as a sale and acquisition of the transferor's assets effected through the issuance of the survivor's stock. The rights of
shareholders will often differ sharply according to which view is
taken. For a classical merger, the traditional statutes usually require approval by a majority or two-thirds of the outstanding voting shares of both constituents, and normally give appraisal rights
to the shareholders of both constituents. For a sale and acquisition
of substantially all assets, however, the traditional statutes may
not give appraisal rights to the transferor's shareholders, and do
not explicitly provide either voting or appraisal rights to the survivor's shareholders.
Similarly, in the absence of explicit statutory provision a
stock-for-stock combination may be viewed, from the survivor's
perspective, either as a merger with the transferor or as an acquisition of the transferor's stock. For a classical merger, the traditional
statutes give the survivor's shareholders both voting and appraisal
rights. For an acquisition of stock, however, the traditional statutes
do not explicitly give either of these rights to the survivor's
shareholders.2
2. For a discussion of the classical merger and the stock-for-stock and stock-for-assets
EISENBEERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL

modes of combination, see M.
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Economically, a stock-for-assets transaction is normally identical to a classical merger. Where previously there were two entities,
two sets of assets, two sets of liabilities, and two sets of shareholder groups, there is now one entity, one set of assets, one set of
liabilities, and one shareholder group. Similarly, from the survivor's perspective a stock-for-stock combination is economically
equivalent to a classical merger in most cases, and when followed
by a preplanned liquidation of the survivor, it is virtually indistinguishable from a classical merger. The traditional corporate statutes, which explicitly cover classical mergers but not stock-forstock and stock-for-assets combinations, may have made sense
when the classical merger was the dominant form of combination,
but that was long ago. In the area of corporate combinations, the
traditional statutes are more than a half-century out of date.
Most courts, when called upon to determine the rights of
shareholders in a corporate combination, have pierced through the
form of a combination to look at its economic substance. 3 Most
legislatures, however, have failed to revise their statutes to provide
a systematically integrated treatment of combinations, or even to
explicitly recognize the newer modes of combination. Several statutes, most notably those of California and Ohio, are exceptions.
The California statute, adopted in 1975, begins by defining "reorganization" to mean (1) a merger; (2) an exchange (stock-for-stock)
reorganization, in which the survivor, through an exchange of equity securities, attains ownership of shares carrying more than fifty
percent of the transferor's voting power; or (3) a sale-of-assets reorganization, in which the survivor issues equity securities or longterm unsecured debt securities as consideration for substantially
all of the transferor's assets." A merger or sale-of-assets reorganizaANALYSIS 215-51 (1976).

3. See, e.g., Rath v. Rath Packing Co., 257 Iowa 1277, 1286, 136 N.W.2d 410, 415
(1965); Applestein v. United Board & Carton Corp., 60 N.J. Super. 333, 348-49, 159 A.2d
146, 154, aff'd per curiam, 33 N.J. 72, 161 A.2d 474 (1960); Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 393
Pa. 427, 435-38, 143 A.2d 25, 30-31 (1958). The major exception is Delaware. See Orzeck v.
Englehart, 41 Del. Ch. 361, 365-68, 195 A.2d 375, 377-79 (Del. 1963); Hariton v. Arco Elecs.,
41 Del. Ch. 74, 76-77, 188 A.2d 123, 125 (Del. 1963).
4. CAL. CORP. CODE § 181 (West 1977); id. § 181 legislative committee comment (West
1977). The California code defines "voting power" as the power to vote for the election of
directors, excluding the right to vote upon the happening of a future condition or event. Id.
§ 194.5 (West 1977). (An example of stock that has the right to vote only upon a future
condition or event is preferred stock that carries voting rights under contractually defined
conditions.) The statute defines "equity security" to include shares, securities convertible
into shares, and warrants or securities representing a right to purchase or subscribe for
shares or securities convertible into shares. Id. § 168 (West 1977). A transaction may qualify
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tion normally must be approved by the shareholders of both constituents, 5 unless the shareholders of one constituent, or their corporation, will end up with more than five-sixths of the voting
power of the combined enterprise. (Approval by that constituent's
shareholders is then not required, on the ground that the reorganization is not sufficiently significant from that constituent's perspective.) An exchange reorganization normally must be approved
by the shareholders of the survivor, subject to the same exception.7
In general, appraisal rights follow voting rights, but appraisal is
usually not available for shares that are listed on certain major
stock exchanges, or included in the Federal Reserve list of overthe-counter margin stocks, unless five percent or more of the class
dissents.a
The Ohio statute is comparable to that of California. It regulates stock-for-stock and stock-for-assets combinations and provides voting and appraisal rights for both combinations.' A few
other statutes have addressed the relevant issues, but much less
adequately than the statutes of California and Ohio.10
as a reorganization even though the survivor issues debt as well as equity securities, but an
exchange of assets solely for debt securities that are adequately secured and mature within
five years after the consummation of the transaction does not constitute a reorganization.
Id. § 181(c) (West 1977).
5. Id. §§ 1200-1201 (West 1977 & Supp. 1983).
6. Id. § 1201(b) (West 1977). Section 1201(c) provides, however, that "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of subdivision (b), a reorganization shall be approved by the
outstanding shares . . . of the surviving corporation in a merger reorganization if any
amendment is made to its articles which would otherwise require such approval." Id. §
1201(c) (West 1977). In addition, § 1201(d) provides that
a reorganization shall be approved by the outstanding shares . . . of any class of
a corporation which is a party to a merger or sale-of-assets reorganization if
holders of shares of that class receive shares of the surviving or acquiring corporation or parent party having different rights, preferences, privileges or restrictions than those surrendered.
Id. § 1201(d) (West Supp. 1983) (underscore omitted). Finally, § 1201(a) provides that, unless otherwise stipulated in the articles, "no approval of any class of outstanding preferred
shares of the surviving or acquiring corporation . . . shall be required if the rights, preferences, privileges and restrictions granted to or imposed upon such class of shares remain
unchanged (subject to the provisions of subdivision (c))." Id. § 1201(a) (West 1977) (emphasis added).
7. Id. §§ 1200-1201 (West 1977 & Supp. 1983).
8. Id. § 1300 (West Supp. 1983).
9. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.01(Q)-(T), 1701.83(A), 1701.84(D) (Page 1978 &
Supp. 1983).
10. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:10-12 (West Supp. 1983-1984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, § 1311F (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 7-1.1-67, -69, -70.1, -73 (1969 &
Supp. 1983). See generally M. EISENBERC, supra note 2, at 233-35, 249 (discussing the Ohio
and New Jersey statutes); H. MARSH, 2 CALIFORNIA CORPORATE LAW & PRACTICE §§ 18.1-19.3
(2d ed. 1983); Folk, CorporationStatutes: 1959-1966, 1966 DUKE L.J. 875, 943-46 (discuss-
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A much simpler scheme-which does not, however, deal with
appraisal-is provided by the rules of the New York Stock Exchange. 1 Under those rules, approval by the issuer's shareholders
is required if a listed company issues securities to acquire a company or business property (or securities representing such interests), and either (1) the issuance of common or securities convertible into common could increase outstanding common by at least
eighteen and one-half percent, or (2) the combined fair value of
the common to be issued and any other consideration is at least
eighteen and one-half percent of the market value of the issuer's
outstanding common. The rules of the American Stock Exchange
are comparable. 2
The California and Ohio statutes, and the exchange rules,
show that a modernized and sensible treatment of corporate combinations is both technically feasible and legislatively practicable.
They therefore serve to underscore the failure of the great majority
of states to modernize their corporate statutes in this important
area.

13

ing the Ohio statute).
11. See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 312.00 (1983).
12. AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE GUIDE (CCH) I 10,198A (Apr. 1983):
§ 712. Acquisitions-Approval of shareholders is required ... as a prerequisite
to approval of applications to list additional shares to be issued as sole or partial
consideration for an acquisition of the stock or assets of another company . . .
where the present or potential issuance of common stock, or securities convertible into common stock, could result in an increase in outstanding common
shares of 20% or more.
Id.
13. Another problem concerning combinations relates not so much to statutory obsolescence as to incomplete modernization. This problem is raised by the triangular merger. A
conventional (or forward) triangular merger works this way: Assume that corporations Survivor and Transferor want to engage in a merger in which Survivor will be the survivor and
Transferor's shareholders will end up with 100,000 shares of Survivor. In a normal merger
this would be accomplished by having Survivor issue 100,000 shares to Transferor's shareholders. In a conventional triangular merger, Survivor instead begins by creating a new subsidiary, Survivor/Sub, and then transfers 100,000 shares of its own stock to Survivor/Sub in
exchange for all of Survivor/Sub's stock. Survivor/Sub and Transferor then engage in a statutory merger, but instead of issuing its own stock to Transferor's shareholders, Survivor/
Sub issues its 100,000 shares of Survivor stock. The net result is that Transferor's business
is owned by Survivor's wholly owned subsidiary (rather than by Survivor itself, as in a normal merger), and Transferor's shareholders own 100,000 shares of Survivor stock. By use of
this technique, Survivor may therefore achieve the advantages of a statutory merger while
insulating itself from direct responsibility for Transferor's liabilities. (I say "may," because a
court could impose these liabilities on Survivor under the de facto merger doctrine, on the
theory that in effect Survivor itself is a constituent to the merger. See M. EISENBERG, supra
note 2, at 215-52.)
A reverse triangular merger proceeds like a conventional triangular merger, except that
instead of merging Transferor into Survivor/Sub, Survivor/Sub is merged into Transferor.
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B. Shareholders' Informational Rights
It seems self-evident that shareholders should be adequately
informed about the financial results of their managers' stewardship
and of material conflict-of-interest transactions between the corporation and its managers. In corporations with a very small number
of owners, it can perhaps be taken for granted that shareholders
will acquire such information: most or all shareholders are likely to
participate in management, all shareholders are likely to have significant holdings, and the corporation is likely to operate in the
shareholders' geographical backyard. In publicly held corporations,
however, those conditions do not prevail:
(1) Because ownership and control are separated, shareholders typically do not participate in management.
(2) Because ownership is spread nationwide, shareholders
typically are not in a position to observe managers directly.
(3) Because individual shareholders typically own relatively small stakes, an individual shareholder's transaction costs
of going to court to get information are likely to be out of proportion to the gains he could derive from that information. 4
The merger agreement provides that all previously outstanding Transferor shares are automatically converted into the 100,000 shares of Survivor held by Survivor/Sub, and that all

shares in Survivor/Sub (which are held by Survivor) are automatically converted into shares
of Transferor. When all the shooting is over, therefore, Survivor/Sub will have disappeared,
Transferor will be a wholly owned subsidiary of Survivor, and Transferor's shareholders will
own 100,000 shares of Survivor stock. By use of this technique Survivor may therefore
achieve the advantages of a statutory merger while preserving Transferor's legal status,
which could be important when Transferor has valuable rights under contracts, leases, licenses, or franchises.
The problem raised by triangular mergers is that they may allow subversion of shareholder voting and appraisal rights, because it can be argued that voting and appraisal rights
on the survivor's side are vested in Survivor (as the sole shareholder of Survivor/Sub) rather
than in Survivor's shareholders. A better conclusion would be that a triangular merger does
trigger voting and appraisal rights in Survivor's shareholders, either on the theory that Survivor should be deemed a constituent to the merger, or on the theory that such a result is
necessary to prevent subversion of the merger statutes. See M. EISENBERG, supra, at 277307. Ideally, however, this problem should be dealt with by the statute itself. For example,
under the California statute, CAL. CORP. CODE § 1201 (West Supp. 1983), a merger reorganization must be approved by the shareholders of a corporation that is "in control of any
constituent.

. .

corporation.

. .

and whose equity securities are issued or transferred in the

reorganization." Id. § 1200(d) (West 1977).
14. The third proposition may be less true for institutional shareholders. Nonetheless,
even an institutional shareholder is likely to balk at expending funds to produce information that by its nature will almost certainly be public (and therefore available to the entire
market) at the moment of its production. In any event, under present law smaller publicly
held corporations, which are the corporations least likely to have significant institutionalinvestor shareholdings, are the very corporations that are often not required to distribute
information. See infra p. 197.

19831

MODERNIZATION OF CORPORATE LAW

Shareholders in publicly held corporations will, therefore,
often be less than adequately informed about the financial results
achieved by managers and about conflict-of-interest transactions,
unless the corporation is affirmatively obliged to disseminate the
relevant information to its shareholders. Nevertheless, until the
1930's, corporation law generally did not require publicly held corporations to disseminate either financial or conflict-of-interest
data. Even in the 1930's, it was not the states but the federal government that filled this vacuum, through adoption of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.' Today, a corporation with securities registered under the Exchange Act must file with the Securities and
Exchange Commission, and disseminate to its shareholders, extensive information on its financial condition and on material transactions between the corporation and its principal managers. These
requirements, however, apply to only a fraction of all publicly held
corporations, because they are applicable only if a corporation has
at least 500 record holders of a class of equity securities.1 6 This
number may be appropriate for determining the applicability of
federal law to corporations. It is, however, well above the line distinguishing those corporations in which shareholders are likely to
acquire financial and conflict-of-interest information in the natural
course of events, from those in which shareholders are likely to remain uninformed unless dissemination is affirmatively required.
Accordingly, there is an obvious need to require corporations
that have significant public ownership, but less than 500 shareholders, to disseminate to their shareholders information on
financial results and material conflict-of-interest transactions. Only
a few state statutes, however, have adequately addressed that
need. California is one such state. Under the 1975 revision of the
California statute, any corporation that has 100 or more record
shareholders, and is neither registered under the Exchange Act nor
exempted from such registration, must send its shareholders an annual report that includes a balance sheet, an income statement,
and a statement of changes in financial position for the fiscal
year. 7 The financial data must be prepared in conformity with
generally accepted accounting principles. The annual report must
also describe any transaction during the previous fiscal year, in15. 15 U.S.C. 78a-78kk (1982).
16. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 12(g), 15 U.S.C. 781(g) (1982). Even an issuer
with 500 holders of a class of equity securities is exempt if it does not have $3 million in
assets. See SEC Rule 12g-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (1983).
17. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 1501 (West Supp. 1983).
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volving an amount in excess of $40,000, in which a director, officer,

or more-than-ten-percent shareholder had a direct or indirect material interest, and any indemnification exceeding $10,000 paid
during the fiscal year to any officer or director. Corporations with
less than 100 record shareholders must send to their shareholders
an annual report that includes a balance sheet, an income statement, and a statement of financial change. The financial data must
be prepared on a reasonable basis, and the accounting basis used
in the preparation of the data must be disclosed. In these smaller
corporations, mandatory dissemination of an annual report may be
waived in the bylaws, but if it is, any shareholder is entitled to the
relevant information on request. Moreover, five-percent shareholders in any size corporation are entitled, on request, to an interim
statement covering the elapsed quarters of the current fiscal year.
The Model Business Corporation Act also addresses the need
for dissemination of information to shareholders, although on a
more limited basis."8 Section 52 of the Model Act, as revised in
1978,'9 provides that every corporation must furnish to its shareholders annual financial statements, including a balance sheet and
an income statement. The statements must be prepared on the basis of generally accepted accounting principles if the corporation
prepares financial statements for the fiscal year on that basis for
any purpose.2 0 The California and Model Act provisions demonstrate the practicability of requiring the dissemination of vital information to shareholders in smaller publicly held corporations.
Nevertheless, it still appears that most statutes do not address the
issue at all, and even those that do are often subject to critical
limitations.2 1
18. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 52 (1979).

19. 34 Bus. LAW. 1616 (1979).
20. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 52 (1979). Financial statements audited by a public
accountant must be accompanied by a report setting forth his opinion. Financial statements
that are not so audited must be accompanied by a statement of the president or the person
in charge of the corporation's financial accounting records. The relevant person must (1)
state his reasonable belief as to whether the financial statements were prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles and, if not, describe the basis of presentation, and (2) describe any respects in which the financial statements were not prepared on
a basis consistent with those prepared for the previous year. Id.
21. Under the Ohio statute, for example, the corporation must make available a balance
sheet and a summary income statement to shareholders who attend annual meetings or who
make a written request for the statement within sixty days thereafter. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1701.38 (Page 1978). Under the Pennsylvania statute, a balance sheet and an income
statement must be sent to shareholders unless the bylaws provide otherwise. PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 1318 (Purdon 1967). Some statutes require disclosure to shareholders of indemnification or advances of expenses to directors arising out of proceedings by or in the right of
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C.

Corporate Distributions

A corporation normally distributes funds to its shareholders in
one of two ways: by paying a dividend, or by repurchasing or redeeming a portion of its stock. Corporate law has traditionally set
limits on such distributions through the use of various financial
tests that center on the concept of preserving legal capital. 2
Most of the statutes adopt either a balance-sheet or an
earned-surplus test. Under a balance-sheet test, distributions may
be made only out of surplus, as opposed to legal capital. Broadly
speaking, surplus falls into two basic categories: earned surplus,
which is more or less equivalent to accumulated earnings; and capital surplus, which consists of a variety of sub-accounts, including
paid-in, reduction, and revaluation surplus.
In apparent contrast, earned-surplus statutes begin by limiting
distributions to that part of surplus that represents accumulated
earnings. Typically, however, these statutes go on to permit distributions out of capital surplus under defined circumstances. In the
final analysis, therefore, earned-surplus statutes, like balance-sheet
statutes, turn on the preservation of legal capital.
What then is legal capital? Originally, it was the aggregate par
value of issued stock. In a bygone era, all shares had a par value
and most probably were issued at a price equal to par value. In
that era, the concept of legal capital had a certain economic significance: legal capital was conventionally more or less equal to the
economic capital created by the issue of stock. Modern statutes,
however, do not require that shares have a par value, and even
shares that have a par value may carry a par value much lower
than the price at which they are issued. Accordingly, the economic
capital generated by the issue of stock may be much greater than
the corporation's legal capital, which has become a mere legal construct determined in a wholly arbitrary manner. The excess of economic over legal capital that is created on the issuance of shares is
designated as paid-in surplus. Distributions can normally be made
out of paid-in surplus without violating either a balance-sheet or
an earned-surplus statute. Furthermore, legal capital itself can be
reduced by a shareholder vote, and the resulting reduction surplus
the corporation. See, e.g.,

MD. CORP.

& ASS'NS

CODE ANN.

§ 2-418 (Supp. 1983). See gener-

ally Oesterle, Limits on a Corporation's Protection of its Directors and Officers from Personal Liability, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 513, 548-49 & nn. 106-08 (collecting such statutes).
22. For a discussion of the financial tests applied to corporate distributions, see W.
CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1338-90 (5th ed. 1980); B.
MANNING, A CONCISE TEXTBOOK ON LEGAL CAPITAL 59-90 (2d ed. 1981).
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can also be used as a source of distributions under either type of
statute. Thus the impoverished protection afforded creditors by
prohibiting distributions out of legal capital is wholly bankrupted
by the warrant to reduce capital and pay dividends out of the
reduction.
A related lack of economic reality is found in the statutory
treatment of a repurchase by a corporation of its own shares. 23
From the perspective of creditors, a repurchase is economically indistinguishable from a dividend. Under most statutes, however, a
repurchase of shares, unlike a dividend, may not irreversibly decrease surplus, because repurchased stock is conceived of as "treasury stock" and retains the status of issued stock until cancelled or
reissued. The rationale of this treatment is that repurchased shares
resemble an asset, because they can be resold. In modern corporations, however, authorized shares normally far outnumber issued
shares, or easily can be made to do so by certificate amendment.
Accordingly, a repurchase of shares normally enables a corporation
to do nothing more than it could have done without the repurchase. Economically, therefore, repurchased shares are no more of
an asset than are authorized but unissued shares.
In sum, the traditional statutory provisions concerning distributions bear virtually no relation to economic reality. Involuntary
creditors, trade creditors, and short-term lenders must normally
take this law as they find it. Institutional lenders and preferredstock underwriters, however, have the power to impose contractual
restrictions on distributions beyond those imposed by corporation
law, and they normally do so.2' The contractual restrictions com-

monly employed in long-term and preferred-stock underwriting
agreements tend to demonstrate what kinds of limits on distributions are economically significant and workable. Under the most
common pattern found in long-term loan agreements, for example,
the corporation promises not to make a distribution to shareholders unless the proposed distribution, plus all other distributions after a given date, would be less than earnings accumulated after
that date plus the proceeds of new stock issues. The relevant date,
known as the "peg date," is usually the beginning of the fiscal year
in which the debt is issued.2 5 This requirement may be supple23. For a general discussion of corporate stock repurchases, see W. CARv & M. EISENsupra note 22, at 1423-31.
24. For a general discussion of the ways in which creditors protect themselves against
excessive corporate distributions, see B. MANNING, supra note 22, at 91-107.
BERG,

25. During the initial period after the agreement is made, the corporation might not
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mented by a provision that working capital (current assets minus
current liabilities) will not fall below a designated level, thereby
helping to preserve the quality as well as the quantity of net worth.
In 1975, California modernized its statute along lines comparable to those of long-term loan agreements. To begin with, the California statute drops the concepts of "legal capital" and "surplus";"
classifies dividends, repurchases, and redemptions as "distributions"; 7 and treats all distributions under a common set of rules.2 8
To oversimplify slightly, a distribution to shareholders is permitted only if (1) retained earnings equal or exceed the proposed distribution, or (2) immediately after the distribution, the corporation's assets will be at least one-and-one-quarter times its
liabilities, and current assets will equal or exceed current liabilities. 9 In addition, the statute includes an equity insolvency test,3 0
and it prohibits any distribution to holders of a junior class if, following the distribution, the excess of assets over liabilities would
be less than the aggregate liquidation preferences of senior classes.- 1 Finally, reacquired shares revert to the status of authorized
but unissued stock.-2 Thus the building blocks of the California
statute are not empty legal concepts, like legal capital and treasury
stock, but economic realities, like retained earnings, asset-liability
ratios, and liquidation preferences.
In 1979, the Model Act was revised along similar lines.3 3 Prior
to that time, the Model Act had become a wastebasket of dividend
accumulate earnings or issue new stock. To permit distributions in that event, the agreement often provides the corporation with a cushion, either by setting the peg date back into
the past, or by adding to the funds available for dividends a specified amount known as the
"dip." The dip frequently approximates the corporation's net income for the fiscal year
before the loan or one or two years' dividends at the corporation's established dividend rate.
26. CAL. CORP. CODE ch. 5 legislative committee comment at 364 (1977).

27. See id. § 166 (West 1977).
28. See id. §§ 500-510 (West 1977 & Supp. 1983).
29. Id. § 500 (West Supp. 1983). If the corporation's earnings before taxes and interest
expense have not been covering its interest expense, current assets must be at least equal to
one-and-one-quarter times current liabilities. Id. § 500(b)(2) (West 1977 & Supp. 1983).
30. Id. § 501 (West 1977). A corporation may not make a distribution if the corporation
is, or as a result of the distribution would be, unable to meet its liabilities as they mature.
Id.
31. Id. § 502 (West Supp. 1983).
32. Id. § 510 (West 1977).
33. The American Bar Association's Committee on Corporate Laws adopted amendments to the financial provisions of the Model Act on December 8, 1979. See 35 Bus. LAW.
1365 (1980). Text and commentary are reported in Committee on Corporate Laws, ABA
Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act-Amendments to Financial Provisions, 34 Bus. LAW. 1867 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the MBCA].
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tests 34 -allowing dividends out of earned surplus, out of current
income without regard to earned surplus, out of amortization, of
wasting assets without regard to either earned surplus or current
income, out of paid-in surplus, out of reduction surplus, and, according to an official comment, out of revaluation surplus.3 5 As revised, the Model Act, like the California statute, drops all references to par value, capital, and surplus; treats dividends and
repurchases under the common heading of distributions; and provides that reacquired shares revert to the status of authorized but
unissued stock.3 6 The commentary accompanying the adoption of
these provisions states that "insolven[cy] in the equity sense . . .
[is] the most important and fundamental test for the permissibility
' '87
of distributions.
There are a number of important differences between the
Model Act and California provisions. For example, as long as liquidation preferences are protected, the California statute permits a
distribution if the corporation either has sufficient retained earnings or satisfies both a total and a current assets-to-liability ratio.
The Model Act provides only a total assets-to-liabilities test, together with an equity insolvency test and protection of liquidation
preferences. In calculating asset-liability ratios, the California statute excludes exotic items such as goodwill, capitalized research and
development expenses, and deferred credits. The Model Act does
not. The California assets-to-liability tests are based on values determined under generally accepted accounting principles. The
Model Act requires only that determinations be based upon accounting principles and practices, or a fair valuation method, reasonable under the circumstances. For present purposes, however,
the important point is not which statute is preferable, but that the
new Model Act provisions, like those of California, are economically meaningful. This cannot be said of the vast majority of distribution provisions on the statute books.
D.

Corporate Structure

Under our national economic system, substantial control over
the factors of production and distribution, and over a large share
34. See

MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT

35. See 1

§§ 45-46 (1979).

MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN.

§ 2 comment at 36 (2d ed. 1971) ("[wjhere

directors revalue assets upward, the corresponding credit is to capital surplus").
36. See sections 2, 6, 18, and 45 of the revised Model Act, in Committee on Corporate
Laws, Changes in the MBCA, supra note 33.
37. Id. at 1881.
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of the resources of individuals and financial intermediaries, is
vested in the hands of the privately appointed corporate managers
of 2000 or so large publicly held corporations. The legitimacy of
this system rests on three fundamental premises: (1) Placing control of the factors of production and distribution in the hands of
privately appointed corporate managers who are accountable for
their performance, and who act in the interest and subject to the
ultimate control of those who own the corporation, achieves a more
efficient utilization of economic resources than that achievable
under alternative economic systems, without entailing unacceptable costs. (2) Corporate managers are in fact accountable for their
performance. (3) Corporate managers act in the interest, and subject to the ultimate control, of the shareholders, who are the owners of the corporation. 8
Given these premises, the legal system must insist on some institution of accountability, external to the managers, that provides
reasonable assurance that efficient utilization of the corporation's
resources is forthcoming. One such institution would be direct review of managerial performance by the body of shareholders. In
the large publicly held corporation, however, this body cannot be
relied upon to conduct the kind of scrutiny required, because of its
disparate and shifting nature and the complexity of modern management issues.
Another such institution would be the market. Three types of
market mechanisms are potentially relevant. The first consists of
the product markets in which the corporation operates, with their
attendant sanction of business failure. This mechanism, however,
is inadequate to the purpose. A large publicly held corporation can
often remain in business for a protracted period of time even with
minimal returns, or may earn acceptable returns only because it is
coasting on programs that prior managers put into place.
The second relevant market mechanism is the capital market.
38. This right is often challenged on the grounds that share ownership is frequently
short-lived and almost invariably derivative in that shareholders typically purchase and sell
stock on the market instead of contributing funds directly to the corporation's capital. This
challenge is difficult to understand. It might equally well be said that a middleman has less
right in his inventory than does a manufacturer, or that a person who buys a house has less
right to its control than a person who builds one. There are other problems with the concept
of ultimate shareholder control-not least, whether the shareholders are interested in exerting control. For present purposes, however, it is sufficient to note that, in our society, control solely by virtue of ownership-hands-on or hands-off-is a fully legitimating principle.
Furthermore, managing the corporation in the interest of shareholders is socially desirable
because their interest coincides with society's interest in efficiency.
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Inefficient managerial performance will increase the cost of equity
capital by decreasing the price at which the corporation's equity
capital sells. A corporation with a large cash flow, however, may be
able to meet its capital needs for a long period of time through
internal and even external financing, although its profits are lower
than good management would produce.
The third relevant market mechanism is the market for corporate control. If the corporation's assets are utilized inefficiently, its
shares may sell at a price low enough to tempt outsiders to acquire
control through a takeover. The takeover mechanism, however,
also provides excessive leeway for managerial inefficiency, because
of the high transaction costs imposed by the inherent mechanisms
of takeover bids, the requirements of relevant statutes, the wide
array of available defensive techniques, the incentives to take over
well-run instead of poorly run companies, and the time-lag that
the public often experiences in ascertaining lack of managerial
efficiency.
Finally, because self-interested transactions are typically not
sufficiently material in dollar terms to have a significant impact on
share prices, market mechanisms, even if fully effective in holding
corporate management accountable for efficiency, are unlikely to
be effective in regulating managerial conflicts of interest. Such conflicts have public as well as private consequences. Even when these
transactions are economically immaterial, they tend to sap the
public's confidence, and therefore its willingness to participate, in
capital markets.
A constraint beyond the market is therefore required as a
check on managerial efficiency, as well as on conflicts of interest.
The implicit model of accountability in the traditional corporate
statutes was one in which the directors managed the business of
the corporation and were accountable to the shareholders. Perhaps
this model was accurate 100 years ago, but management by the
board and direct accountability to shareholders has long since
ceased to be the norm in the large publicly held corporation. Today, it is clear that the business of such a corporation can be managed, in the normal sense of that term, only by full-time executives, and that the shareholders of such a corporation cannot be
expected to monitor (i.e., oversee) the management. In effect, the
management and monitoring functions have each dropped down
one step in the corporate pyramid. The management function has
dropped down from the board to the executives; the monitoring
function has dropped down from the shareholders to the board.
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Accordingly, the primary function of the board should not be to
manage the business of the corporation, as the traditional statutes
prescribe. Instead, it should be to select the chief executive officer
and three or four other top managers (such as the chief financial
and accounting officers), and to monitor or oversee their overall
conduct of the business-primarily to determine whether the top
managers' conduct of the business is efficient, but also to keep an
eye on whether their behavior is consistent with law, generally accepted ethical principles, and standards of humane behavior. Although the board may play a wide variety of other roles, such as
participation in strategic planning and approval of major actions
and plans, the monitoring or oversight function is paramount.
Performance of this function, however, has two critical prerequisites: directors who can monitor objectively, and an accurate and
reliable flow of information to the board. To achieve the first prerequisite, a majority of the directors of a large publicly held corporation should be free of significant relationships to the senior executives, such as familial ties, employment by the corporation, or
significant professional or economic relationships with the corporation. In addition, the nomination of directors in these corporations
should originate in a nominating committee consisting entirely of
directors who have no significant relationships with the corporation's senior executives. Such a committee helps assure board objectivity in two ways. First, it provides an independent locus of responsibility for the composition of the board. Second, it can screen
out candidates who lack objectivity toward the senior executives by
virtue of elements that cannot be adequately captured by an objective test, such as particularly close personal relationships or significant interlocking directorships.
That the issue of board composition is easily susceptible of
statutory treatment is evidenced by a number of sources. For example, the Investment Company Act3 9 provides that no more than
sixty percent of the directors of a registered investment company
may be "interested persons, ' 40 the Canadian 41 and Ontario 42 business corporations acts require companies that issue shares to the
public to have at least two outside directors, and the New York
Stock Exchange requires listed companies to have at least two di39. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-52 (1982).
40. Id. § 80a-10(a) (1982).
41. Canada Business Corporations Act § 97(2), 1978-1979 Can. Stat. 84.

42.

ONT. REV. STAT.

ch. 54, § 120(2)(b) (1980).
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rectors who are independent of management.43 At present, however, no state corporation statute requires that even a single director be free of significant relationships with the senior executives.
Even a board with a majority of directors who have no significant relationships with the senior executives cannot perform its
monitoring function without objective data on the financial results
of the managers' stewardship. Under present practice, the power to
select the accounting principles used in preparing a corporation's
financial statements often lies in the hands of the executives. Virtually the only limit placed on executives is that the accountant
must deem the principles selected by the executives to be "generally accepted." But the accountants' standards for determining
whether a given principle is "generally accepted" are often very
soft.' 4 Furthermore, the accountant's only mechanism for enforcing
43. The recently supplanted Company Manual contained an express requirement of
two independent directors for listed companies. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, COMPANY
MANUAL B-23 (June 15, 1966). The new Listed Company Manual, although failing expressly
to require independent directors, does so impliedly by prescribing the existence of an audit
committee that must have two independent directors. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, LISTED
COMPANY MANUAL § 303.00 (1983); cf NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, RECOMMENDATIONS AND
COMMENTS ON FINANCIAL REPORTING TO SHAREHOLDERS AND RELATED MATTERS 5-6 (1973)
(recommending three or more outside directors).
44. For example, a 1982 article in Fortune, concerning Aetna Life Insurance Company,
reports:
At a roundtable discussion staged by the Wall Street Transcript last May, five
insurance analysts all lamented Aetna's property and casualty troubles, yet went
on to predict that the improved first-quarter results already reported would be
followed by improved results for the year. One analyst, Donald Franz . ...
framed his prediction memorably. Recalling that Aetna's chairman, John H.
Filer, had recently made some positive statements about 1982, Franz said that
earnings would quite likely rise "to ensure that the chairman will not be called a
liar."
Some of the statements Franz had in mind appeared in Aetna's first-quarter
report, in a letter signed by Filer and William 0. Bailey, the company's president. They spoke of "increased balance and stability," of earnings improvements
over the last three quarters, and of "our belief that Aetna will maintain reasonable and improving profits this year."
The remarkable thing about that letter, about a second-quarter letter that
followed, and about the analysts' forecasts to boot is that none of these declarations about Aetna mentioned the overwhelming and extraordinary reason why
its 1982 earnings are up. The reason, made visible only by a terse footnote to
Aetna's financial statements, is tax benefits that the company has been plugging
into its earnings even though at best it will not realize the benefits until sometime in the future.
The effects on the company's 1982 earnings have been dramatic. In the first
six months of the year, Aetna took $138 million of these anticipated tax benefits
into its earnings, an amount accounting for no less than 62% of reported operating earnings of $222 million. Without this boost, the company's operating earn-
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this limit is to withhold a clean certificate from the corporation's
financial statement. 5 Typically, the accountant is dependent on
ings would have been 60% lower than in 1981. Had they been reported in this
skimpy form, the earnings would not have even covered Aetna's first-half
dividends.
And just how unusual are Aetna's tactics? Extremely and undeniably so, to
the degree that it is almost impossible to overstate the point. It is not that operating tax-loss carry-forwards are scarce: lots of companies have them and would
no doubt be delighted to convert them immediately into current earnings. But
generally accepted accounting principles come close to prohibiting the practice.
The problem is addressed in Opinion No. 11, a pronouncement issued by a predecessor of the profession's self-regulatory body, the Financial Accounting Standards Board. The opinion declares that realization of the tax benefits ordinarily
is not "assured" because a company can't know with absolute certainty that it
will have taxable profits in the future against which the loss carry-forwards can
be used. Therefore, says the opinion, tax benefits arising from loss carry-forwards should not be recognized in profits until they are realized, except in unusual circumstances when realization is assured "beyond any reasonable doubt."
A company might pass this test, the opinion then says, if three conditions,
each and all, are satisfied. The first concerns the character of the loss being carried forward: it must have resulted from "an identifiable, isolated, and nonrecurring cause." The second concerns the character of the company: it must have
been continuously profitable over a long period or have suffered occasional losses
that were more than offset by taxable income later on. The third concerns the
character of the taxable income expected: it must with near certainty be large
enough to offset the loss carry-forward and must come along fast enough to deliver the tax benefits within the carry-forward period.
Some accountants, among them Aetna's auditors, Peat Marwick Mitchell,
have interpreted this listing of conditions as providing "such as" guidance; that
is, if a company can meet tests "such as" the ones stated, it may consider its tax
benefits to be realizable beyond a reasonable doubt. The problem with this interpretation is that the accounting office of the Securities and Exchange Commission doesn't agree with it. The SEC regards the conditions as absolute requirements that must be met.
Loomis, Behind the Profits Glow at Aetna, FORTUNE, Nov. 15, 1982, at 54, 54-55.
In a letter, a CPA responded to the Fortune article:
Aetna's inclusion of $138 million in unrealized tax benefits from tax loss
carry-forwards

. . .

is the most flagrant case of earnings management I've ever

seen. When John Shad took over as chairman of the SEC, he said that his goal
was to move away from what he called an excessive emphasis on enforcement,
making it easier for corporations to raise capital. If the SEC has missed too
many cases like Aetna's, it will reach his goal but at the expense of investors who
rely on what are thought to be accurate financial reports.
More than anything else, your article illustrates that the much ballyhooed
self-regulation of the accounting profession is a grisly joke.
Fortune, Jan. 24, 1983, at 20. Eventually, Aetna agreed, under pressure from the Securities
and Exchange Commission, to eliminate $203 million in "tax benefits" from its 1982 earnings, thereby reducing earnings for that year from $522 million to $319 million. N.Y. Times,
July 8, 1983, at D1, col. 3.
45. A clean certificate is an unqualified opinion stating that the financial statements
fairly present the firm's financial condition in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.
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the executives for his tenure in office, and this dependence may
result in an almost irresistible pressure on the accountant to go
along with marginal principles. A leading student of accounting
has said that the accountant "can swallow his convictions or he can
qualify his opinion, or he can resign. Usually the latter two courses
'4 6
are one and the same."

Objective reporting on executives' financial results cannot be
assured in an institutional structure that combines power of selection among competing accounting principles by the very executives
whose activities are being accounted for, wide discretion in the executives in making that selection, and auditing of executives'
financial performance by persons whom the executives hire and
can fire. To achieve an objective flow of information on the
financial results achieved by the executives, the accountant must
be truly independent of the executives. Toward that end, publicly
held corporations should be required to have an audit committee
composed of directors who have no significant relationships to the
senior executives. This committee should be vested with the power
to select and dismiss the independent accountant (or recommend
its selection and dismissal), set the terms of its engagement, and
generally oversee the independent auditing process. Again, however, the statutes fall short. Although the need for an audit committee in publicly held corporations is widely recognized,41 and the
New York Stock Exchange rules require companies listed on that
46. D. LADD, CONTEMPORARY CORPORATE ACCOUNTING AND THE PUBLIC 163 (1963) (quoting Leonard Spacek); see also R. Sterling, Presentation made at Oklahoma State University,
Distinguished Lecture Series (Mar. 16, 1972), reprinted in Statement in Quotes: "Accounting Power", J. ACCT., Jan. 1973, at 61-62 (discussing conflicts of interest confronting auditor
when faced by domineering executive); cf. Andrews, Fewer Companies Get Auditors' Full
Okay on FinancialReports, Wall St. J., Apr. 17, 1975, at 1, col. 6 (auditors risk discharge
when they issue qualified opinions); Andrews, Why Didn't Auditors Find Something Wrong
with Equity Funding?, Wall St. J., May 4, 1973, at 1, col. 6 (a too-intimate relationship
between auditor and company may have been, in part, responsible for Equity Funding collapse); Metz, Market Place: Real and Ideal in C.P.A. Audits, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1972, at
52, col. 3 (questioning independence of auditors).
47. See, e.g., Committee on Corporate Laws, ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and
Business Law, Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 1591, 1626-27 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Corporate Director's Guidebook]; Committee on Corporate Laws, ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, The Overview Committees of the Board of
Directors, 34 Bus. LAW. 1837, 1853-61 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Committee on Corporate
Laws, Overview Committees]; The Business Roundtable, The Role and Composition of the
Board of Directorsof the Large Publicly Owned Corporation, 33 Bus. LAW. 2083, 2108-10
(1978); see also PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.05 comment a, at 85-87 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1982) (a high percentage of
corporations have audit committees) [hereinafter cited as PRINCIPLES].
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exchange to have such a committee,' only Connecticut requires an
audit committee by statute. 9
In short, in the area of corporate structure, as in the areas of
combinations, distributions, and dissemination of information, the
corporate statutes speak to conditions of the nineteenth instead of
the late-twentieth century. Most of the statutes literally require
management by the board, which is virtually impossible in the
publicly held corporation. Almost none speak to the critical issues
of board independence and the need for nominating and audit
committees in large publicly held corporations.
III.

PROSPECTS FOR THE MODERNIZATION OF CORPORATE LAW

Within the last ten years or so, there has been a remarkable
amount of ferment in the area of corporate law. For the moment,
the American Law Institute's Principlesof Corporate Governance:
Analysis and Recommendations"0 is at center stage, but the ferment precedes that project. In 1977, the Business Roundtable issued its statement on The Role and Composition of the Board of
Directors of the Large Publicly Owned Corporation." In 1977 and
1978, the ALI, the American Bar Association's Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, and the ALI-ABA Committee on
Continuing Professional Education, jointly convened four important regional conferences on corporate law.52 In 1978, the American
Assembly issued a report on Corporate Governance in America, 53
8
and the ABA Section issued the Corporate Director's Guidebook. '
In 1979, the ABA Section issued a follow-up guidebook, The Over5
view Committees of the Board of Directors. This ferment appears to have been precipitated in large part
by several developments in the mid-1970's. One was the general
reexamination of our institutions that followed in the wake of
Watergate. An element of Watergate was the revelation that some
of our largest corporations had been engaged in widespread viola48. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303.00 (1983).
49. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-318(b) (West Supp. 1983-1984).
50. Tentative Draft No. 1 of this project, PRINCIPLES, supra note 47, was approved by
the ALl Council in 1982, but was not submitted to the membership for a vote. It is now
being extensively revised.
51. The Business Roundtable, supra note 47.
52. See COMMENTARIES ON CORPORATE STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE: THE ALI-ABA
SYMPOSIUMS 1977-1978 (D. Schwartz ed. 1979) (edited transcripts of the four conferences).
53. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN AMERICA (1978) (54th American Assembly).
54. Corporate Director's Guidebook, supra note 47.
55. Committee on Corporate Laws, Overview Committees, supra note 47.
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tion of domestic law, and some others had paid bribes to persons
at the highest levels of foreign governments and thereby recklessly
endangered our national security by putting at risk the political
stability of our closest allies." In the short term, these disclosures
led to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977.1' In the long
term, they needlessly shook the public's confidence in one of the
pillars of legitimacy of the American corporate system-the premise (which I regard as correct) that placing control of the factors
of production and distribution in the hands of privately appointed
managers maximizes our national wealth without entailing substantial nonfinancial costs.
A second development precipitating the current reexamination
of corporate law appears to have been a growing realization by the
profession that such a reexamination was needed sooner or later,
and was best conducted now, in an atmosphere of relative calm.
The priority of this need was accentuated by the publication in
1974 of Bill Cary's article Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware," which delineated a new concept of federal
corporate law. For half a century or more, the idea of federal incorporation has been floated as a response to the defects in corporate
statutory law. The name under which that idea passes is somewhat
misleading. Usually, corporations may choose the law under which
56. For example, a 1983 Wall Street Journal article reports:
Lockheed Corp. is resisting a fresh attempt to unseal some still-untold secrets

about its overseas payoffs, which touched off a scandal in the 1970s that shook
governments around the world.

In fact, says a Lockheed lawyer in papers filed in federal court here, disclosure could have a "devastating impact upon the reputations and careers of a
number of foreign officials, some of whom hold positions of importance to the
foreign relations of this country."
Lockheed's known payoffs were indeed embarrassing when disclosed. Prince
Bernhard of the Netherlands, who allegedly received $1 million, resigned official
duties. Former Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka of Japan is still on trial on the
charge he took $2 million, and a verdict is scheduled to be handed down Oct. 12.
Several Italian officials, including a former defense minister, were convicted in
1979 in connection with alleged bribes of $2 million.
To settle an SEC suit, Lockheed admitted making as much as $38 million in
questionable payments overseas in countries including Taiwan, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Kuwait, Argentina, Colombia, Spain, Saudi Arabia, Peru and
Venezula.
Wall St. J., Oct. 3, 1983, at 10, col. 1. Tanaka was subsequently convicted. N.Y. Times, Oct.
12, 1983, at Al, col. 5.
57. Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a note, 78m, 78dd-1,
78dd-2, 78ff (1982)).
58. Cary, supra note 1.
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they wish to become incorporated. Under the traditional idea of
federal incorporation, however, all or certain classes of corporations would be required to incorporate under a federal statute that
would govern their internal affairs. That idea never got off the
ground, for at least two reasons. First, statutory corporation law is
filled with an enormous amount of trivia concerning such matters
as what goes into the certificate of incorporation and how much
notice must be given for meetings. These are matters with which
Congress would not appropriately be concerned. Second, there is
an extremely strong tradition in this country that regulation of
corporate internal affairs is a matter for the states.
Against this background, Cary proposed that Congress should
adopt an act that would set minimum standards in selected areas
of corporation law to govern publicly held corporations, but would
leave everything else to the states. The effect of this concept was to
make federal corporate law appear more feasible: Because a minimum standards act would cover only selected corporate areas, Congress would not have to legislate on trivia. Because of the structure
and coverage of such an act, all corporations would still be incorporated under state law, all but a few thousand corporations would
be entirely regulated under state law, and even these few thousand
corporations would be entirely regulated by state law in the areas
not covered by the act.
In 1980, Cary's concept was given tangible expression. Senator
Metzenbaum introduced a federal corporate minimum standards
bill in the Senate, 59 and the late Congressman Rosenthal intro-

duced a companion bill in the House. This expression of the concept turned out, perhaps not surprisingly, to be short-lived-the
bills did not go forward. The more fundamental effect of the concept, however, was to help move the reexamination of corporate
law to a high position on the legal agenda, and therefore, somewhat
ironically, to increase the likelihood that state corporation law will
be modernized and revitalized in a manner that would render the
concept moot. To the extent that the problems in statutory corporation law have arisen out of a legislative concern with franchisetax dollars, the relevant state legislatures will undoubtedly prefer
59. Protection of Shareholders' Rights Act of 1980, S. 2567, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126
REC. S3754 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1980).
60. Corporate Democracy Act of 1980, H.R. 7010, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
Protectionof Shareholders' Rights Act of 1980: Hearings on S. 2567 Before the Subcomm.
on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. 360 (1980).
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modernizing their own statutes to the threat of losing control to
Congress. To the extent that the problems in statutory corporation
law have arisen out of lack of information about the obsolescence
of some critical statutory provisions, the current reexamination of
corporate law will bring much-needed information to state legislative attention. Accordingly, there is now reason to hope that state
legislatures will respond to the present reexamination of corporate
law by modernizing their statutes in a manner that deals fairly and
efficiently with both management and shareholder interests, so
that the problems a federal statute would entail can be avoided.
Whatever factors have motivated the present reexamination of
corporate law, it is clear that the reexamination is long overdue.
The American corporate system is a complex economic machine,
and statutory corporate law is one of the important subsystems on
which the machine is based. Some components of that subsystem
are badly in need of modernization. Modernization always entails
some present costs, but typically they are much less than the future costs of obsolescence.

